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"THINK THINGS, NOT WORDS": JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
KERMIT

L. HALL*

INTRODUCTION

"The earth," wrote Thomas Jefferson, "belongs to the living; .. the dead
have neither power nor rights over it."1 Jefferson believed that the survival of
the new American nation depended on the ability of its constitutionally
limited government to accommodate social and economic change. Jefferson
once proposed that each generation of Americans write its own constitution,
leaving previously adopted fundamental laws to expire naturally every nineteen years. 2 Jeffersonian rhetoric never matched reality; the third President did
nothing during his two terms either to convene a constitutional convention or
to mount an extra-constitutional attack on the government. Nonetheless,
Jefferson's notion of constitutional development as an evolutionary process
has fostered the growth and persistence of the American nation. A special irony
surrounds this development. Jefferson harbored profound suspicion of the Supreme Court because it was not popularly responsive. 3 Yet, through the
mechanism of judicial review, the Court has usually fulfilled the task of
adapting the Constitution to social and economic change. Moreover, because
the Court adjudicates the constitutionality of state and federal legislative,
executive, and judicial acts, its invocation of judicial review has a kinetic
4
effect - government has often been set against itself.
Recent scholarly analysis threatens to lose this broad and usefully ironic
perspective on judicial review in a tangential debate about how "styles" of
judicial reasoning have changed. 5 This literature should be understood for what
it does: it implodes historical analysis. It uses history to prove the existence of
*Associate Professor of History and Affiliate Associate Professor of Law, University of
Florida. B.A., 1966, University of Akron; M.A., 1967, Syracuse University; Ph.D., 1972, University of Minnesota; M.S.L., 1980, Yale University.
1. 5 THE WITINGs oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 116 (P. Ford ed. 1899).
2. Id. at 121.
3. R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBUC 42,
65-66, 80-81, 103-04, 238-42 (1971).
4. This notion of government set against itself is argued in G. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF Ta AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 257-390, 453-62 (1969).
5. For examples of these debates, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANsFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTh AMENDMENT (1977); P. BOBBrIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE
THEORY OF THE CONsTrrTION (1982); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTUST: A THEORY Or JuDicaAL REvmw (1980); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968); Grey, Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. 1. REv. 703 (1975); Nelson, Changing Conceptions of
Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA.
L. REv. 1166 (1972); Wolfe, A Theory of U.S. ConstitutionalHistory, 43 J. PoL. 292 (1981).
For a different approach to judicial review and history, see Levy, Judicial Review, History,
and Democracy, in JUDICIAL REvmw AND THE SUPREME COURT 1 (L. LEvy ed. 1967).
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change over time and then dismisses history as but a useful guide to setting the
agenda of debate over contemporary uses of judicial review. One scholar has
argued boldly that such an approach makes it "possible to discuss contemporary
judicial review without making the mistake of thinking that it is based on
Marshall's reasoning in Marbury v. Madison."7
Each generation, of course, attempts to write its own constitutional history.
For example, the survivors of the American Civil War attempted to wrap a
shield of historical orthodoxy and justification around both sections' constitutional position and political leadership in the secession crisis. In the wake of
the rise of totalitarian regimes and world war, the present generation's concern
about accommodating political democracy to social inequality has prompted a
similar effort at enlisting history.8 Judicial review, because it promises to cut
through interest-bound contemporary politics, offers critics of the contemporary
political and social order a means of fashioning social justice. At the same time,
the undemocratic character of judicial review threatens democratic norms. 9
This, more than anything else, explains the often convoluted debate about the
legitimacy of judicial review and the use of relativistic history to justify it by
emphasizing changes in sLyle and argument while ignoring its persistent
functional importance.1o
The words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ought to provoke healthy
skepticism about current analyses of judicial review. "We must think things, not
words," Holmes wrote, "if we are to keep the real and the true."'" Ransacking
history and judicial argument misses the proverbial forest for the trees. The importance of the historical context of judicial review is that while the styles and
arguments (the words) have changed, the functions of judicial review (the
things) have remained largely constant. History teaches that judicial review in
the American scheme of republican government is today what it was at the
nation's inception: a necessary, although not always sufficient, means to accom6. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional
History, 69 Am. His. REv. 64 (1964). For lawyers' usage of constitutional history in constitutional adjudication, see generally C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UsEs OF HISTORY

(1969).
7. Wolfe, supra note 5, at 293.
8. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 66, 69-70.
9. See Levy, supra note 5, at 12-14.
10. Scholars concerned with the contemporary crisis over the uses of judicial power
frequently give quite different emphasis to the role of history in judicial analysis. Compare
R. BERGER, supra note 5 with P. BOBBiTr, supra note 5. Berger undertakes the most serious
recent attempt to argue that the practice of judicial review should adhere to the historical
record. Thus, judicial review can only be invoked when it is consonant with the framers'
original understanding of a constitutional provision. Berger quite clearly believes the federal
judiciary has been too active, and that history offers an important way of curtailing that
activism. Bobbitt, on the other hand, has an altogether more relativistic view of the past and
of historical evidence. He seeks to validate judicial review by insisting that attention to
history too tightly constricts the discretionary power of judges. Yet Bobbitt comes to the
problematic conclusion that "the present must to some extent control the past." P. BoBBrrr,
supra note 5, at 239.
11. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 H~Auv. L. REv. 443, 460 (1899). See
generally Carter, Think Things, Not Words, 43 J. POL. 317 (1981).
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modate social and "political change to the rule of law and to maintain liberty
through a government permanently set against itself.
NASCENT JUDICIAL REVIEW -

SETTING

GOVERNMENT AGAINST ITSELF

In 1787 the framers of the Constitution sought to ensure the new nation's
popular legitimacy while bolstering the stability and authority of the national
government. Thus, the same document fused elements of both popular
sovereignty and fundamental law. 12 Under James Madison's leadership, the
framers reconciled the need for a broadly-based popular government sensitive
to state interests and individual rights, with a viable national government
capable of promoting domestic tranquility and prosperity and defending
American interests abroad. They made the Constitution the fundamental law
of the nation after popular ratification by elected conventions. While providing
that government derive its legitimacy from the will of the people, the framers
viewed unchecked popular government as a threat to the rights of minorities,
especially property owners, merchants, investors, and slaveholders. To protect
these minority rights, the Constitution enshrined the rule of law that neither
popular majorities nor their representatives could claim to be above the
Constitution. Every act of government ultimately had to be measured against
13
the Constitution.
By juxtaposing popular sovereignty and fundamental law, the framers
endeavored to prevent tyranny of either the majority or of central power.
Madison successfully urged the Philadelphia Convention to adopt constitutional provisions intended to prevent the accretion of power to a majority, an
individual or one branch of government.1 4 A scheme of checks and balances reinforced the Constitution's separation of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers. Yet there were limits to the quest for liberty; the framers disagreed
about the best way to proceed. As a result, the Constitution at its inception
was notable for its open-ended phrasing. The Constitution adopted in 1788
and the Bill of Rights, attached as amendments in 1790, contained few explicit
substantive prohibitions or commands. Instead, it sketched a process of government. With the nation's fundamental law so vaguely drawn, whoever had the
authority to interpret its meaning had the power to enunciate constitutionally
acceptable public policies.' 5 Considerations of fundamental law became, at
least in part, considerations of politics. Ultimately, constitutional judgments
had inescapable ramifications for often conflicting social interests. If the
Constitution invited evolutionary interpretation of its meaning, it failed to
indicate upon which branch of government this responsibility would devolve.- e
The Supreme Court prevailed as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution.
The Court's ascendancy resulted from a convergence of astute leadership,
12. See G. WooD, supra note 4, at 273-81, 383-90.
13. See generally E. CowitN, TIE "HMGHER LAw"

BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITuToNAL LAW (1955).
14. See R. DAmm, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-33 (1956).

15.

See J. ELy, supra note 5, at 43-72.

16.

See R. McCrosKY, THE AMRCAN SuPRM
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sensitivity by the justices to the inherent limits of judicial power, and the
willingness of the elected branches to defer to the seeming objectivity of the
judicial process for resolution of politically volatile issues. This deference has
often thrust the Court into controversy and subjected it to political attacks
against the legitimacy of judicial review. 17
Neither in article III nor elsewhere in the Constitution did the framers explicitly grant the Court power to review the actions of state and federal governments. There was precedent for judicial review in the actions of English and
colonial courts, but this only suggests that the framers were aware of the
practice; it does not indicate that they wanted the Court to exercise such power.
The debates at the Philadelphia Convention provide few hints and often
contradictory evidence."'
The most persuasive explanation for the growth and acceptance of judicial
review emerges from an understanding of the framers' general intentions for
the Constitution, the structure of article III, and the relationship of article III
to the remainder of the Constitution. The framers blended popular sovereignty
and fundamental law in the same document, but without making either superior. They thus created the Court to reconcile, through judicial processes, the
clash of competing majority and minority interests. Moreover, the supremacy
clause unequivocally made the Court the highest court of appeals to treat
matters of law. No other branch was made strictly appointive and no other
branch was made to accept its work wholly in terms of legal disputes. The
framers painstakingly divorced the judiciary from the executive branch, so
much so that they rejected an attempt to substitute a council of revision for the
Court. The framers intended the Court to meet the task of setting government
against itself. The Court's ability to review with finality actions of the other
branches and of state governments was crucial; otherwise, its pronouncements
would have been susceptible to legislative repeal, executive order, or state
interposition. Under these terms the Constitution could not have been supreme.' 9 The Court's decision on a constitutional issue, as opposed to a mere
interpretation, can be reversed only through constitutional amendment.
Strikingly, only five such reversals have occurred in American history.20
17. See id. at 16-17.
18. There is an extensive body of literature devoted to the question of whether the
framers intended judicial review or the Court usurped it. See generally B. CoxE, AN ESSAY ON
JUDICIAL POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION (1970); C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE
OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1959); Anderson, The Intention of the Framers: A Note on Consti-

tutional Interpretation, 49 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 340, 340-42 (1955); Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MICH. L. REv. 102, 102-25, 283-316 (1910). Compare W. CROSSKvY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(1953) (arguing that
judicial review was not part of the original constitutional system) with R.
V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969) (arguing that it was).

BERGER, CONGRESS

19. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 29-30, 78, 8990 (1969).
20. The eleventh amendment (1795) overruled Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793); the thirteenth (1865) and fourteenth (1868) amendments overruled Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); the sixteenth amendment (1913) overruled Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); the nineteenth amendment (1920) overruled Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875); and the twenty-sixth amendment
(1971) overruled Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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Finally, the framers ensured the judiciary's independence by providing that
federal judges hold appointive offices during good behavior with salaries that
cannot be diminished.21
In keeping with their intention to prevent the concentration of power in
one branch, the framers adopted constitutional devices limiting the Court's
power. Justices can be removed, after impeachment by the House and trial
before the Senate, for high crimes and misdemeanors. Impeachment, however,
has been a hollow threat. Associate Justice Samuel Chase, the only member of
the Court ever impeached, easily escaped conviction at his Senate trial in
1804.22 Subsequently, the unwieldy impeachment process has been viewed as an
impractical way of dealing with members of the Court. Nevertheless, as more
recent attempts to impeach the late Justice William 0. Douglas indicate, it'
still remains a threat. Congress possesses other, more subtle and significant
controls over the Court. Congress funds the Court; it may increase or decrease
the number of Justices; it can expand or contract the Court's appellate jurisdiction; and the Senate shares with the President the power to appoint Justices.
These various constitutional devices have been more important as potential
restraints than as weapons regularly used by Congress to coerce the Court into
cooperation. They serve the important function of warning Justices, both individually and collectively, of the consequences of too often and too unabashedly breaching the boundary between law and politics. Congressional
retaliation against the Court is always possible; the Constitution makes it so.
Congress has displayed little willingness to exploit these powers because indiscriminate tampering with the Court would undermine the legitimacy of the
constitutional order. Moreover, Congress recognizes the utility of having the
Court treat controversies unresolvable through popular political processes. 23

The most significant limitation on judicial review derives from the Court's
nature as a judicial body. The Justices cannot summarily declare unconstitutional any law or lower court decision. They can act only when a justiciable
issue, rooted in a genuine legal controversy, is presented to them. The legal and
social issues before the Court have thus been largely beyond its control. Before
1925, the Court's docket was composed mostly of cases brought on writs of
error claiming that error had occurred in the adjudication below. The Court
had almost no alternative but to hear and decide such cases. Even if the Court
found a way to avoid issuing a direct decision on the case, this inaction gave the
lower court decision res judicata effect. The Judiciary Act of 1925, however,
sharply curtailed the writ of error basis for appeal, while dramatically expanding the Court's ability to invoke the writ of certiorari. Certiorari allowed the
Court greater discretion to choose the cases it wished to decide. The Justices
therefore could better manage the docket and concentrate their energies on
constitutional issues they considered significant. 24 Unlike failure to decide a
case brought on a writ of error (or appeal, as it is now called), denial of
21.
22.

23.
(1966).
24.

US. CONsr. art. Inl, § 1.
See R. ELLis, supra note 3, at 96-108.
See generally R. MoRGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CoNSTriMroN: A STuDY iN REspoNsmunrY

See J. Huasr, Twi

GRowrh

oF

AMEIcN LAw: THE LAW MAxS
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certiorari does not make the lower court decision res judicata.2 Nonetheless,
socially-based litigation means that issues before the Court today, as in the
previous two hundred years, are not of its making.
THE SUPREME COURT AS PUBLIC FORUM
AND TEMPLE OF JUSTICE

The Court's invocation of judicial review has mirrored the evolution of
American society and reflected the Justices' ongoing contributions to the process
of nation-building. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed when he visited America
in 1832: "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."26 Issues of substantial
popular controversy, such as slavery, abortion, paper money, civil rights, and
the income tax, have been transformed by a highly litigious population into
legal controversies. Popularly elected officials often have preferred to avoid
troubling political controversies by falling back on the seeming objectivity and
mystery of the Court. This search for judicial solutions to political controversies
has had a two-fold impact on the Court.2 7 First, the Justices have frequently

confronted the difficult task of deciding whether to decide a case, knowing that
failure to act may affect the litigants and the Court's reputation and power as
greatly as would rendering a decision. Second, the Court, as interpreter of
fundamental law and potential instrument of public policy, has developed a
split personality. It has become both temple and forum. On the one hand, because the citizenry expects and the Constitution impels the Court to treat disputes in a reasoned and dispassionate fashion, it has become a temple of
national justice that symbolizes fairness, due process, and objectivity. On the
other hand, the Court has become a public forum before which competing
2
interests plead often intractable policy disputes.
When the Court has invoked judicial review in its capacity as a public
forum, its contribution has been most dramatic and controversial. A relative
few Court decisions have interrupted and punctuated the broad pattern of
stability and public acceptance of the Court's role. Invariably, the disjunctions
have mirrored underlying cleavages in American society. Although the Justices
at these critical junctures have undergone popular and political attack, they
and the rule of law have prevailed.
The work of the Court since 1789 has passed through three historical
epochs: 1789 to 1865, 1865 to 1937, and 1937 to the present.29 Imposing a
scheme of chronological evolution on the Court's judicial review undoubtedly
distorts the subtlety and complexity of historical development. This schematization, however, does emphasize the dynamic quality of the Court's work, the
25. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsTrruTIONAL LAW 66 (1975). The Court has
historically limited the cases it will hear and decide through such doctrines as substantiality,
mootness, ripeness, standing, political questions and others. See id. at 71-75, 1532-1652.
26. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEmOcRACY IN AMERICA 280 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
27. See R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 16, at 23-25.
28. See Mason, The Supreme Court: Temple and Forum, in AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL
LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 225-41 (W. Levy ed. 1966).

29. R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 16, at 23-25.
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impact of social change on its decisions, and the Court's repeated attempts, as
a public forum, to achieve political as opposed to constitutional ends through
judicial review.
1789 to 1865
From 1789 until 1865 the Court sought to define its role in the relationship
between the nation and the states. The Constitution established a federated
republic in which powers not specifically granted to the national government
were reserved to the states or the citizenry generally. Beginning with Chief
Justices John Marshall in 1801 and Roger Taney in 1835, the Court interpreted
the contract and commerce clauses in ways that emphasized federal supremacy,
over the states. 30 The Court's role-seeking task was complicated for two reasons.
First, before the Justices could use the Court as a public forum, they had to
establish their constitutional right to exercise the power of judicial review.
Second, with Southern chattel slavery sufficiently threatening the Union's
survival, the Justices pondered whether to exploit their newly-won power of
31
judicial review by intervening in the politically charged slavery issue.
Between 1793 and 1816 the Court established the legitimacy of judicial review. The Justices proceeded along two related paths. Under the leadership of
the first Chief Justice, John Jay, the Court began the tradition of issuing
opinions only in cases with a justiciable issue and a genuine legal controversy.
In 1798, the Justices rejected a request from President Washington to construe
the constitutionality of a proposed Proclamation of Neutrality. The jurists
refused to issue an advisory opinion because the proclamation presented no
legal controversy rooted in the adversarial process. 32 The previous year, in
Hay burn's Case,33 the Court had declined to follow an Act of Congress requiring
it to review administratively Revolutionary War veterans' pension requests
because the case presented no justiciable issue. By refusing to assume power,
the Court reinforced its role as an interpreter of fundamental law through
the judicial process.
In 1801, under Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court transformed its
commitment to judicial independence into judicial review. The 1808 case of
Marbury v. Madison34 contributed to this process. The defendant, Secretary
of State James Madison, a Jeffersonian Republican, refused to deliver a justice
of the peace commission to William Marbury, a Federalist. At issue was
whether the Court could direct Madison to deliver the commission to his
political opponent. The unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice
Marshall declared that while Marbury deserved his commission, the Court
lacked power to direct the delivery. Congress had exceeded the Court's
constitutionally prescribed original jurisdiction by granting it the power to
30. See R.

NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHA.L

AND

TANEY

56-88, 94-107

(1968).
31. D. FERENBAcHER, TE Dred Scott CASE: ITS SIGNInCANCE IN AsmuCAW
PoLrrxcs 211-38 (1978).
32. G. GumzR, supra note 25, at 1535-37,
33. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).

LAW AND

34. 5 U.s. (1 Crtnch) 137 (1803).
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intervene. Chief Justice Marshall thus side-stepped the politically explosive
issue of Marbury's fate by feigning judicial impotence, while successfully
asserting the crucial power of the Court to set aside acts of Congress. The
Court's seeming refusal to accept power was actually a dramatic assertion of
power. Moreover, Chief Justice Marshall unequivocally articulated a fundamental proposition of American constitutionalism: the Court alone has the
ultimate power to interpret the meaning of the Constitution and to determine
the rule of law. 35
The Court's successful assertion of judicial review over acts of state legislatures and decisions of state courts was important under federalism. In the
pre-Civil War period, this type of judicial review allowed the Court to contribute significantly to the debate about the relationship between the states
and central government. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., observed: "I do
not think the United States would come to an end if [the Justices] lost
[their] power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be
imperiled if [they] could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
several States." 36 In 1810, in Fletcher v. Peck, 37 the Court declared a Georgia
statute void under the contract clause of the federal Constitution. Similarly,
in the 1816 case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,38 the Court defended the
legitimacy of Supreme Court review of state court judgments resting on
interpretations of federal laws and the Constitution. By successfully asserting
the constitutional power to review state legislative acts and court decisions,
Chief Justice Marshall thrust the Court into the nation-building process.
The Marshall and Taney Courts relied on judicial review of state legislation and state court decisions to affirm the Constitution's national scope, especially for economic matters. In a series of contract clause cases, the Court
struck down state attempts to control contracts entered into by citizens of
different states, rejected sweeping attempts by the states to assist bankrupt
debtors, and offered significant protection for corporations. 9 Furthermore, in
1819, in McCulloch v. Maryland,40 the Court voided a Maryland tax levied
on the Baltimore branch of the nationally-chartered Second Bank of the United
States. Chief Justice Marshall not only reiterated the Court's power to declare
state laws unconstitutional, but construed the necessary and proper clause of
article I with a breadth that granted Congress significant latitude in promoting
economic development. 41 The theme of economic nationalism also permeated
the Marshall and Taney Courts' reading of the commerce clause. In Gibbons v.

35. See D. DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS MADISON: THE POLrrIcAL BACKGROUND OF Marbusy
v. Madison 185 (1970). See also G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 204 (1981).
36. 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
37. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
38. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
39. See, e.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843); Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830); Ogden
v. Saunders, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
40. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
41. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss2/4
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Ogden,42 and subsequent commerce clause decisions, the Court facilitated the
spread of an interconnected national transportation system and the rise of a
national market economy.43 Thus, from both the contract and commerce
clauses, the Court fashioned constitutional law into a creative instrument of
public policy-making that turned the individual acquisitive spirit of pre-Civil
War Americans into a robust quest for national economic aggrandizement.As the English historian Lord MacCauley noted at mid-century, the American
45
"Constitution [was] all sail and no anchor."
The inherent limitations on the Court as a national public forum were
dramatically revealed when it moved from economic issues to the constitutional
knot of slavery. Until the Dred Scott 46 decision in 1857, the Court gingerly sidestepped the slavery controversy, although most Southern Justices were clearly
4
In response to national upheaval
sympathetic to the peculiar institutiony.
generated by westward expansion and political anti-slavery in the 1850s,
the Court fatefully struck down the Missouri Compromise, held that Blacks
were not citizens, and concluded that national government had a constitutional
responsibility to secure property rights of masters everywhere in the Union. 48
The Taney Court's Dred Scott decision was the first dramatic instance of the
limitations that the judicial function imposes on the Court when it attempts
as a public forum to settle deep-seated political controversies. The Court's decision neither settled the slavery issue nor stilled sectional rancour. The Civil
War underscored the limits of the Court's powers and of the judicial process
generally to settle intractable constitutional issues rooted in profound political
and social divisions. Only Northern force of arms preserved the Constitution
49
as fundamental law.
1865 to 1937
The Court emerged from the Civil War and the repercussions of Dred
Scott bent but not bowed.50 The Justices eschewed the opportunity to decide
the politically charged issues flowing from the War and Reconstruction. In
order to retain their power to settle authoritatively questions of fundamental
law, the Court adopted the doctrine of political questions. Much as the Court
had done before the War under both Marshall and Taney, the post-Appomatox
Court husbanded its judicial power by refusing to settle questions most
42. 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
43. See R. NErmVER,supra note 30, at 39, 49-52, 101-02, 109, 114.
44. This development involved a move away from Marshall's conception of vested
property rights toward a recognition that individual property might be used to facilitate a
general public purpose. See the Taney Court's decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (state grant to operate a toll bridge could not be implied
to forbid grant for competing bridge). See also S. KumLER, PRIVInE AND CRETATv DESmurION: TiE Charles River Bridge CAsE (1972).
45. J. BARTLmEr, FAMmR QUOTATioNS 494 (rev. 13th ed. 1955).
46. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
.47. See D. FEHR&NACHER, supra note 31, at 188-208.
48. 60 US. (19 How.) at 448-52.
49. 'See D. FEHmmNBACmR, supra note 31, at 568-95.
50. S. Ku'm, JumCIAL PowER AND RECONSRUCrION PoL1TIcs 6 (1968).
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properly left to the legislative and executive, the political branches of government. 51 This strategy complemented a war-weary nation's continuing reverence
for the Court and the higher law tradition of stable government associated
with it. By refusing to enter the political fray of War and Reconstruction, the
Court persisted as a temple of justice.
In the post-War era, constitutional issues arising from rapid industrialization replaced pre-Civil War concerns of state-nation relations5 2 Once again, the
Court became a public forum. Litigation stemming from rapid industrialization and the rise of the business corporation crowded its docket from 1865 to
1937. The Court's decisions during these years divide chronologically into two
categories. Between 1865 and about 1900, the Justices restricted state and
federal legislative attempts to interfere with business activity. Between 1900
and 1937, while adopting a somewhat more positive view of such governmental
activity, the Court nonetheless repeatedly struck state and federal legislative
efforts to mitigate the social consequences of industrialization. By 1937 the
Court's strident opposition to the welfare state clashed with the harsh human
consequences of the Great Depression. 53
As a public forum concerned with government-business relations, the Court
increasingly resorted to judicial review of state and national legislative initiatives. Between 1865 and 1900, the Court overturned 137 state laws and fifteen
municipal ordinances, more than twice the number declared void in the previous seventy-five years. From 1900 to 1937, the tempo of judicial activism
increased as the Justices declared over 400 state acts void. The Court was also
more willing than in pre-War years to strike down federal legislation, although
it proceeded more cautiously than it did with state legislation. Between 1865
4
and 1937, sixty-two federal statutes were found unconstitutional.
In the post-Civil War era, the Court used judicial review to transform the
Constitution from a charter of powers into a bill of limitations on states and,
to a lesser extent, on federal interference with business activity. The Court
arrogated the broad power to adjust the relationship between government
and business through interpretation of the commerce clause, the taxing
power, and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 55 In contrast
to earlier Court decisions, the post-Civil War Justices restricted and narrowed
the power of Congress and the states to regulate the national market economy.
In the industrializing economy, commerce came to mean more than the mere
exchange of goods across state boundaries - it meant the growth of manufacturing. Yet, the Justices resisted federal efforts to regulate production as an

51. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1 (1849).
52.

See generally H.

HYMANS,

A

RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION

MORE PERFECTION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND

(1973).

supra note 16, at 136-79.
54. A. KELLEY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 545 (rev. 4th ed. 1970).
Since 1937 the Court has almost doubled again its invocation of judicial review against state
and federal legislation. Id.
55. See L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 1877-1917 248-54
53.

R.

MCCLOSKEY,

(1971).
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aspect of the new economy. In 1895, in United States v. E. C. Knight,56 the
Court decided that manufacturing was not an act of commerce and that
businesses engaged in manufacturing were not subject to federal anti-trust
regulation. This decision left the national government almost powerless to
regulate new forms of corporate manufacturing. The Court adopted a
similarly narrow view of using the commerce power to protect workers in industrial production. Thus, in 1918 it declared the Federal Child Labor Act,
which restricted the hours that children could work, an unconstitutional
57
extension of the commerce power into the area of production.
While narrowly construing the commerce power in reviewing federal
regulatory initiatives, the Justices read it more expansively when states attempted to adjust social conditions to the new economic order. For example,
interstate shippers and railroads were allowed to set rates without concern
for local economic consequences. 5 This dual reading of the commerce clause
resulted in a constitutional no-man's land closed to state and federal regulation. Only Congress' decision to create the Interstate Commerce Commission forced the Court grudgingly to back away from its hostility to governmental interference with national commerce. 59
The Court's most dramatic and consistent application of judicial review to
state legislative enactments flowed from the fourteenth amendment. Ratified
by the states in 1868, the amendment afforded a modicum of constitutional protection to newly-freed Blacks against state action proscribing liberties won in
the Civil War.60 After a period of uncertainty, the Court denied the legislative
protection intended by the amendment. Instead, it narrowly interpreted the
due process and equal protection clauses. By 1896, the Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson6 evolved a doctrine of separate but equal facilities for Blacks in
public places. In post-Civil War America, the separate but equal doctrine translated into wholesale exclusion of Blacks from better-equipped White public
facilities, and judicial acceptance of racial discrimination.
While reducing the protection afforded Blacks by the fourteenth amendment, the Justices unintentionally promulgated an innovative meaning for
the amendment by recognizing corporations as legal persons that enjoy substantive protection of their property rights. The Court's "substantive due process" interpretation of the fourteenth amendment during the years up to 1937
further eroded state efforts to adjust social needs to industrialization. Unlike
any other post-Civil War action, the Justices' invention of the doctrine of substfntive due process again turned the Court into a public forum.62
In the 1930s the Court's hostility toward governmental economic and public
welfare regulation collided with the harsh social and business destruction of
the Great Depression. The Justices came under sharp political and public
56.
57.
58.
59.

156 U.S. 1 (1895).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 US. 251 (1918).
See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
See ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 215 US. 452 (1910).
60. See M. BENEDIcT, A COMPROMISE OF PRUOIPLE 825-27 (1974).
61. 163 US. 537 (1896).
62. See L. BET=, supra note 55, at 67-68, 170, 175-82.
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attack when they systematically struck portions of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal program. There remained, as at the time of Dred Scott, a substantial reservoir of popular respect for the Court's role in interpreting fundamental law. When President Roosevelt attempted in 1937 to alter the Court's
decision-making process by packing the tribunal with Justices favorable to his
programs, Congress refused to pass the necessary legislation. 63 The Justices
appreciated, as had their predecessors during the Civil War, the clear limitations of judicial review. The Court could not survive as the authoritative
interpreter of the Constitution and continue to frustrate attempts by the
popularly elected branches to stem the consequences of the Depression. The
result was a minor judicial revolution in 1937. 64 A new Supreme Court
majority retreated from earlier constitutional positions and sustained critical
elements of federal and state New Deal legislation.65 In view of President
Roosevelt's sweeping election victory in 1936, the Court's actions reflected
continuing respect for the impact of popular will on the constitutional process.
The Justices supplemented judicial review with a healthy dose of judicial
restraint. They crawled out of the public forum and back into the temple,
leaving Congress broad discretion under the commerce, taxing, and spending powers to manage the economy and public welfare. 66
1937 to Present
As in the post-Civil War era, the changing contours of American society
after 1937 produced new constitutional controversies. Racial minority groups,
most notably Black Americans, demanded that the Court extend the constitutional revolution begun in 1937. During the post-World War II period es7
pecially, demands for racial equality and political and civil rights were fused.
The Court reacted to its new agenda by affirming the Constitution as a
charter of power rather than a bill of limitations. The Court once again
emerged as a public forum. The Justices employed judicial review to promote racial integration, reapportion legislative districts, and extend the
franchise and rights of the accused. The post-1937 Court adopted the position
that much of the Bill of Rights, when incorporated in the fourteenth amend63.

Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Supreme Court "Packing" Plan, in

THE NEw DEAL

ESSAYS ON

122-59 (W. Drozen ed. 1969).

64. E. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION LTD. 69, 78 (1941).
65. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Ref. & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (19,1) (denied
due process challenge to a state statute fixing maximum fees for employment agencies);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upheld federal minimum wage and overtime
rate regulations under due process); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)
(upheld federal statute excluding "filled milk" from interstate commerce); Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619 (1937) (sustained an exclusively-federal old age pension program under
Congress' spending power); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustained
five to four a state regulation of women's wages, overruling earlier decisions); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upheld federal labor regulations as within
Congress' commerce power).
66. See supra cases cited note 65. See generally McClosky, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34.
67. See P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN Cmisis TIMEs, 1918-1969 93, 276, 474 (1972);
McCloskey, supra note 16, at 208-19.
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ment, was meant as a limitation on state as well as national government.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren from 1954 to 1969, the
Court functioned in the area of individual rights as a substantive policymaking institution.68
The Warren Court willingly accepted a public forum role, and in this
capacity wrought fundamental change in the constitutional position of Black
Americans. The United States suffered from the political and social consequences of a history of racism rooted in slavery. Beginning in the 1930s, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People adopted a
strategy of constitutional litigation designed to enlist the moral and legal
authority of the federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, to alter the
constitutional status of Black Americans.60 This strategy culminated in the
1950s and 1960s in landmark Supreme Court decisions under the fourteenth
amendment that overruled the doctrine of separate but equal in public
facilities. In the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of Education,7o the Justices
interpreted the equal protection clause as an affirmative constitutional
command to the states to end the historic separate but equal practice. The
Court declared that, in view of the minority position of Blacks in American
society, segregation of the races was inherently unequal. This decision marked
the beginning of often controversial federal court involvement in public
education. In unprecedented ways, federal district court judges, with the
Supreme Court's blessing, have taken an active role in the administration of
many public school systems. When state legislatures have refused to end
discrimination, federal courts have responded affirmatively to suits filed to
compel such an end.7
The Warren Court also employed judicial review affirmatively to enhance individual political and civil rights. The majority of Justices frequently
took exception to state and federal legislative attempts to curtail individual
expression on the basis of some compelling state interest. 2 The vigorous antiVietnam War and civil rights protests of the 1960s, which relied on extra-legal
means and civil disobedience, created a classic confrontation between individual expression and governmental restraint. These confrontations were
essentially new constitutional issues. 73 The Warren Court refused to hold free
68. See P. MURPHY, supra note 67, at 310-52.
69. L. MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT oF THE UNrrED
STATES AND THE NEGRO 258-59 (1966).

70. 347 US. 483 (1954).
71. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Ed. of Educ., 402 US. 1 (1971). See
generally Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Came: Antidiscrimination Law in the
Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 742 (1974). On the
Warren Court and the fate of its commitments on the race issues, see generally J.
WiLKINsON, FROM

Brown TO Bakke:

THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION

1954-1978

(1979).
72. See J. ELY, supra note 5, 69-70, 73-75, 113-15, 124-25, 148-49.
73. Although the first amendment specifically provides that Congress shall pass no law

abridging freedom of speech, it was not until 1965 that the Supreme Court first overturned
a congressional act on free speech grounds. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 US. 301
(1965) (struck down federal restrictions on delivery of communist propaganda from
abroad). Indeed, until the second decade of the 20th century, the Court abided by the
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speech absolute, however, it expansively read the speech, press, and religion
clauses of the first amendment. 7 4 Moreover, the Court declared that freedom of
association emanated from the first amendment and created a right of privacy
under the general terms of the ninth amendment.75 Throughout the area of
individual liberties, the Warren Court used judicial review to push the first
amendment into issues that the political branches of government, for often
compelling political reasons, refused to enter."6 The Court again set government against itself by allowing individual rights under fundamental law to
prevail over strict majoritarian control.
The judicial activism of the Warren Court also relied on judicial review
to enhance popular sovereignty by opening the political process. The Court's
response reflected the changing demands of Black Americans and city dwellers
77
for a larger voice in state legislatures and Congress. The Court interpreted
the equal protection and due process clauses to end the all-white party
78
primary system in Southern states and to abolish the poll-tax. The Court
also employed the equal protection clause to require reapportionment of state
legislative and congressional districts. To this end, in its landmark "one man,
79
one vote" 1962 decision of Baker v. Carr, the Court partially abandoned its
self-imposed commitment not to settle political questions. The Warren
Court became deeply enmeshed in Baker and later cases in specifying state
political processes. The Justices eschewed restraint and consciously plunged
into a public forum role to sustain popular sovereignty as an integral part of
the Constitution.- As a result, new demands were forthcoming to limit the
8
Court's jurisdiction and actually to impeach Chief Justice Warren. '
CONCLUSION

The Warren Court's judicial activism resonated with the Jeffersonian
decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), that
the Bill of Rights applied only against the federal government. See generally B. MuRPHY,
supra note 67, at 68-96.

74. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (struck state statute outlawing advocacy of violence. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (struck school-board composed daily
prayer for students); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (struck state statute
forbidding sale of obscene materials to minors which might invite violence).
75. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 483 (1965) (state anti-abortion statute violates
right of privacy); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (state requirement of public disclosure of an organization's membership violates freedom of association).

76. See, e.g., Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (upheld passport
rights of Communist Party leaders).
77. See Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and
Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 810, 810-12 (1974). See also J. WILKINSON, supra note 71, at 1091.
78. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 667 (1966) (invalidated poll tax
as "invidious discrimination" against poor); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (held
fifteenth amendment forbids exclusion of blacks from Democratic primary elections in
Texas).
79. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
80. See R. DIXON, DEMocRATIc REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AN[ POLITICS

244-328 (1968).
81. See P. MuuPHY, supra note 67, at 389, 482.
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notion that the earth belongs to the living. The Court, of course, has not
through its history consistently fulfilled that role. The nature of the judicial
function and the persistent tension between popular sovereignty and fundamental law, when combined with the Justices' own predilections, have
narrowed the Court's constitutional options and constrained the Justices'
vision of whom to count among the living. The Court that today reads the
Constitution as a protection for Black Americans once decided that an earlier
generation of Blacks could be treated as second-class citizens or, as in Dred
Scott, not as citizens at all. To a far greater extent than the popularly elected
branches of government, the Court must live with its history. Yet the Court, in
its dual capacities as a public forum sensitive to popular sovereignty and as a
temple to the maintenance of fundamental law, has played a crucial part in
adjusting constitutional development to changing social realities. On occasion,
as in Dred Scott and the New Deal cases, the Court has either misread popular will or overextended its reach in an attempt to settle deep-rooted social and
political conflict. The Court has always adjusted. Its influence in American
government has increased and not diminished. Although bereft of the power
of the purse and the sword, the Court has flexed its self-created power of
judicial review. Judicial review has enabled the Court to fulfill the role the
framers intended for it - ensuring that in a federated republican government
predicated on popular sovereignty the restraining hand of judicial authority
would consistently hold controversial public issues up to the scrutiny of fundamental law. From its beginnings, therefore, the American government has
been deliberately set against itself.
The institutional evolution of the Court reveals one of the central paradoxes of American history: as a republican democracy, the United States has
flourished for nearly two hundred years because of the contribution of a nondemocratic Supreme Court. This has been achieved in different ways at
different times, although most frequently through judicial review. Yet, for all
the change and adaptation, the Court as a temple of justice has given extraordinary stability to the American constitutional system. Styles of judicial
reasoning and the nature of judicial argument have changed, but the function
of judicial review has remained constant. In the contemporary debate over
judicial review, we should remember Justice Holmes' admonition to think
things, not words.
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